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Chapter One: Introduction
“Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not
willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”.1 David
Hume’s well-known question brings the problem of evil into clear view and puts both Christian
and critical scholars to the test in answering the dilemma presented. The discussion found in this
paper will address Hume’s questions and his argument, but it is necessary to define the
parameters of this discussion as the problem of evil is a broad problem and contains various
components. The following two distinctions must be made that will set the parameters for the
discussion at hand:
1. This discussion will center around the philosophical problem of evil, not the emotional
problem of evil.
2. This discussion will primarily come into focus surrounding the issues of natural evil, not
the issues of moral evil.
The first distinction is critical to make for practical reasons both within the writing of this
paper and outside of it. When questions about the problem of evil are posed, they can easily be
confused for the philosophical problem of evil when they are questions, not of the mind, but of
the heart. It is not the intention of this discussion to answer directly the questions pressing on the
heart of the one who suffers at the hand of natural evil. Instead, it is the goal of this study to offer
suggestions of the possible answers to the matters dealt with in the mind. The writing found here
is a continuation of study and dialogue that has occurred for thousands of years surrounding this
topic and is designed to continue that conversation in a meaningful way that may add to the
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philosophical part of the problem. Consider two practical examples that showcase the difference
between the philosophical problem and the emotional problem of evil.
If, sitting by campfire with coffee in hand, a colleague asked the question, “where is
God?,” it may be assumed well that she is referring to the location of God in the universe. She is
asking a question that falls within a philosophical discussion. If, by contrast, a grieving widow
asks by the casket of their deceased spouse, “where is God?,” one would be wise not to delve
into philosophical discourse. It would be wise to recognize that the question in this setting, is a
question regarding the emotional problem of evil. The discussion to be had here is designed to
answer questions of the first type, the questions regarding the philosophical considerations of the
problem of evil. It is entirely possible that the work and study completed here and read later may
help someone struggling with the emotional problem of evil, but that is not the design of this
work. Instead, this discussion will center around the philosophical problem of evil.
The second distinction to make is also important because the problem of evil is not
separated only into the philosophical component and the emotional component. It is segmented
also into moral evil and natural evil. The difference between these two types of evil will be
evaluated further in this study, but it is important to share the initial distinction from the
beginning. Some philosophers and thinkers have different responses to moral evil and natural
evil, while others believe both moral evil and natural evil can be answered in the same way.
Whether both types of evil can or cannot be answered in the same way is not currently of
importance; however, it is necessary to briefly share the difference between the two types of evil.
Consider the following example to illustrate the different questions asked when
considering the various components of moral and natural evil. First, concerning moral evil, one
may ask, “why would God allow that person to commit that evil on their neighbor?” This
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question puts focus on God’s decision to allow an individual the free will to make a decision and
God’s decision to not intervene once the decision is made by the individual. Second, regarding
natural evil, one may ask, “why would God allow the tree to fall during the storm and injure the
child?” This question puts the focus on God’s decision to allow a storm to occur and God’s
decision to not intervene when it caused natural evil. There is further study that reveals the more
subtle nuances between moral and natural evil and, in some cases, how what appears to be an
instance of natural evil is truly an instance of moral evil. Again, this discussion will primarily
come into focus surrounding the issues of natural evil.
Now that the two relevant parameters have been shared, it is time to briefly share the
roadmap for this discussion. Attention will first be turned to the work of Alvin Plantinga and his
contributions to the discussion surrounding both moral and natural evil. His argument will
function as a foundation of study as it considers the role of humanity’s free will in the existence
of evil, possible reasons God may have to permit evil to exist, and God’s ability to create
possible worlds containing certain characteristics. Next, the discussion will shift focus directly to
the problem of natural evil beginning by defining what natural evil is. Plantinga’s argument will
then be evaluated in terms of its relevance to specifically to the problem of natural evil.
Following this evaluation, several Christian defenses will be shared beginning with the work of
Augustine of Hippo, John Feinberg, John Hick, and a fourth defense inspired by George
Schlesinger who put God’s greater purpose for humanity into clear view. Finally, the discussion
will make a final turn beginning with an analysis of the G.E. Moore Shift, followed by the main
suggestion proposed in this discussion which will be referred to as the “Evil Defeated Defense.”
This defense works alongside Moore, William Rowe, Stephen Wykstra, and others to offer a
defense of Christianity in light of the discussion at hand regarding the philosophical problem of
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natural evil. It makes use of a similar ‘shift’ as the one suggested in the G.E. Moore Shift. Now
that relevant parameters have been set and the roadmap for discussion is in clear view, it is time
to turn to the first step, which is the philosophical problem of evil and Alvin Plantinga.

6
Chapter 2: Moral Evil
Plantinga’s Free-Will Defense
Alvin Plantinga shares an effective defense of Christianity in light of the issue of moral
evil. Plantinga first reminds his audience that many people believe that the existence of evil
creates a problem for a theist. Specifically, “many believe that the existence of evil makes belief
in God unreasonable or rationally unacceptable”. 2 Recall how David Hume phrases the problem:
“Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then
he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?”. 3 It is vital to understand
Hume’s presupposition in order to see how one may respond to this series of questions. Hume
presupposes that if God is both able and willing to eradicate all evil, or to never allow it in the
first place, then He would have done so. Is it possible, contrary to what Hume’s presupposition
suggests, that God does have a reason to permit evil? If it is possible that He has a reason to
permit evil, then Hume is not considering all of the possibilities at hand. In short, Hume’s
understanding of how God works can be understood in the following way:
1. If God is able and willing to eradicate evil, then evil does not exist.
2. God is able and willing.
3. Therefore, evil does not exist.
It is self-evident, however, that premise 3 is not true. One can identify occurrences of evil
through the observable world around them. According to Hume, this must mean that premise 2 is
not true or that God does not exist. John Mackie also points out Hume’s presupposition by
adding what he calls “additional principles”. Mackie writes, “these additional principles are that
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good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can,
and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do”.4 As Mackie clarifies, Hume
believes that if God is good, able, and willing then He would eliminate evil as far as He can, and
He has no limits because He is omnipotent.
Mackie’s additional principles create two points to consider. First, does God eliminate
evil as far as He can? This first point is similar to Hume’s assertion. The second point, to be
discussed later, is if there are limits to what God can do as an omnipotent being. The dilemma
that Hume presents can be solved by allowing for the possibility that God may have reasons to
permit evil. Restating Hume’s argument with this possibility in mind would produce the
following argument:
1. If God is able and willing to eradicate all evil, then evil does not exist unless God has a
reason to permit the evil that exists.
2. God is able and willing to eradicate all evil.
3. Some evil exists.
4. Therefore, God has a reason to permit the evil that exists.
The difficultly that this argument presents the theist is not whether God has a reason to
permit evil, but the difficulty is found in deciding what exactly that reason is. Plantinga points
out that “the theist would rather know what God’s reason is for permitting evil rather than simply
knowing that it’s possible that He has a good one”. 5 It is important at this point to recognize the
significance of this dilemma. If the theist cannot produce a reason for why God would permit
evil, let alone the reason that God permits evil, it does not necessarily follow that God does not
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have a reason to permit evil. It does not necessarily follow that it is no longer rational to believe
in God. The only conclusion that follows from the theist’s inability to produce the reason is that
perhaps the theist is not wise enough to know the reason or that God has not chosen to reveal the
reason to the theist.
Due to this conclusion, Plantinga challenges the atheist to do more than simply point out
that the theist does not know the reason that God permits evil. He challenges them to “show that
it is impossible or anyhow unlikely that God should have a reason for permitting evil”. 6 The core
of Plantinga’s free-will defense is that it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for
permitting evil. He suggests the following two ideas:
1. It is likely that God cannot eliminate one evil without “bringing about a greater evil”. 7
2. “It is possible that God could not have created a universe containing moral good without
creating one that also contained moral evil”. 8
To demonstrate the truth of the first statement, Plantinga shares a simple yet convincing
example of someone rock climbing who scrapes and bruises one of their knees. This person goes
to a friend who is also a doctor and is told that the scrapes and bruises will heal in a couple of
days, and there is nothing they can do to eliminate the pain of the scrapes and bruises other than
amputating the leg. Plantinga uses this example to show that the scrapes and bruises are an evil
state of affairs, and it would be preferable if the scrapes and bruises were not there. The doctor
has power to eliminate the evil state of affairs, but in doing so, would create an even worse evil.
Plantinga illustrates through this hypothetical situation that “it is entirely possible that a good
person can fail to eliminate an evil state of affairs that he knows about and can eliminate. This
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would take place if he couldn’t eliminate the evil without bringing about a greater evil”.9
Similarly, God may not eliminate an evil state of affairs that He both knows about and can
eliminate in order to not bring about an even greater evil.
What significance does this example and conclusion have? It does not show, necessarily,
that God finds Himself in this position. It does show, however, that it is entirely rational to
believe that God could be in this position. It is rational to believe that there is evil that God
cannot eliminate without bringing about an even greater evil. For example, Plantinga shares what
this greater evil could be in the second idea that he suggests: “It is possible that God could not
have created a universe containing moral good without creating one that also contained moral
evil”.10 If God were to eliminate all evil by not creating a universe containing free moral beings,
then an even greater evil would result because such a universe would not exist. The critic may
respond at this point arguing that if God is all-powerful, then certainly He must be able to
eliminate any evil without bringing about an even greater evil. If God is all-powerful, then
certainly He must be able to create a world with no moral evil and only moral good. These
questions are raised naturally by both the believer and non-believer alike, and it presses a
significant question that should be thoughtfully considered. Is it logical to believe that God could
create a world with no moral evil and only moral good? Plantinga approaches this question by
discussing what it means for human beings to have free-will.
Significantly Free Beings
Plantinga’s definition and understanding of human’s free-will is a vital component to his
defense. He describes free-will as being “free with respect to an action. If a person is free with
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respect to a given action, then he is free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions
and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t”. 11 This definition
puts the following two guiding principles into clear view:
1. A person is free, with respect to any given action, to do something or to refrain from
doing it, given that no antecedent conditions or causal laws determine that the person
will perform the action.12
2. A person’s choice to either do or to refrain from doing is not previously determined
by a particular set of conditions or causal laws.
Plantinga further suggests that not only are human beings free with respect to any given
action, but they are also “significantly free”, which means that they are also free with respect to
any given morally significant action. The understanding of human freedom described by
Plantinga is vital in understanding if it is logical to believe that God could have created a world
with no moral evil and only moral good. Consider the following example.
A school-aged child is presented with a morally significant choice while in a grocery
store with his parents. At the register, he sees his favorite candy. He also sees that his parents are
preoccupied with unloading their cart and paying for the groceries. He can either slide the candy
into his pocket and steal it, or he can refrain from doing so by choosing to not take the candy or
by asking his parents if they will purchase it for him. At the given moment, he is free to choose
to steal or to refrain from stealing. The choice belongs to the child because he is significantly
free with respect to this moral action. This example sheds light on the simplicity of how free will
functions in a human being’s life. The boy has the option, however, to refrain from stealing the
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candy. If the boy chooses to refrain from stealing, a neutral state of affairs results. The key point
to understand is that it is entirely up to the boy which option he chooses.
How, then, could God create the world in such a way that this boy never chooses wrong
and evil does not exist? It seems that God could create a world in which evil does not exist, but
the means to achieve such a world are not as appealing as one may like. What potential options
does God have if He desired to create a world with no evil? His first option was to not create
anything or anyone in the first place. Without the existence of morally free beings, there is no
one to act in an evil way. The difficulty with this first option is that if God wished to create a
world and wished to create morally free beings, then not creating a world and morally free
beings would also result in bringing about an even greater evil. His second option, considering
that He did choose to create the world, is to eliminate humanity. If the boy does not exist, then he
is not in the position to choose the wrong choice and create an evil state of affairs. If God chose
to create a world without humanity, then He certainly would have created a world without
humanity’s influence in creating evil states of affairs through their free will. Does this create a
situation, however, similar to what Plantinga described as eliminating evil through bringing
about an even greater evil? It seems self-evident that it is better to exist than to not exist.
Therefore, God could eliminate the evil of state of affairs caused by humans choosing evil only
by bringing about an even greater evil of creating a world in which human beings do not exist.
The third option God has is to remove humanity’s free-will instead of eliminating
humanity. God could force the boy to refrain from stealing, and He could force every human to
choose the morally right action every time. The problem with this option is that removing freewill also eliminates one evil only through bringing about an even worse evil. If human beings do
not have free-will, then they cannot choose God, who is the greatest good. Furthermore, they
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cannot choose anything good. They cannot freely choose to participate in charity, acts of
sacrifice, generosity, or even choose to love someone. It seems self-evident that it is better to be
significantly free than to be forced into every decision even if some decisions that humans make
bring undesirable consequences.
To conclude this section, it is entirely possible that God could have created a world with
no moral evil. However, He could only do so by either eliminating humanity or by removing
humanity’s free-will, but both options would be bringing about an even worse evil. Plantinga
summarizes by saying that it “is possible that God could not have created a universe containing
moral good without creating one that also contained moral evil. And if so, then it is possible that
God has a good reason for creating a world containing evil”. 13 Plantinga’s conclusion can be
stated in the following way:
1. If moral good is to exist, then humanity must be free to choose morally good actions.
2. If humanity is free to choose morally good actions, then they are also free to choose
morally evil actions.14
3. It is empirically true that humanity will choose both morally good and morally evil
actions.
4. Therefore, humanity’s choices will result in moral good and moral evil.
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If God were to decide to eliminate either humanity or humanity’s free-will, He would be
removing the opportunity for relationship between humanity and Himself. It is entirely likely that
God’s choice to allow for relationship with Him and for evil to also exist is not preferred by
some humans, but it does nothing to say that it is irrational to believe that God exists because
evil exists. It only shows that the preferences of some humans are different than what God
prefers. Ultimately, God’s gift of free-will to humanity is what allows for both moral good and
moral evil to exist. The opponent of the free-will defense may go one step further and argue that
God, if all-powerful, could create a world in which only moral good exists and evil does not exist
because there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. As it has been shown, however,
humanity’s free-will results in both moral good and moral evil. Therefore, it is not logically
possible for God to create a world in which only moral good exists. This conclusion leads to the
next question facing the theist: can God do the logically impossible?
Logical “Euthyphro Dilemma”
If, as it has been shown, in order to create a world in which human beings are
significantly free with respect to moral actions, God must give human beings a free will, then the
existence of evil is a result of God’s choice to give human beings a free will and humanity’s
choice to leverage their free will for evil. The critic may then argue that God could have created
a world in which human beings are significantly free with respect to moral actions and evil does
not exist. Plantinga would argue convincingly that such a state of affairs is not logically possible
because of an idea he calls “transworld depravity.” In short, he argues that people “go wrong
with respect to at least one action in any world God could have actualized and in which they are
free with respect to morally significant actions.”15 It is worth considering the question further.
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Could God have created a world in which human beings are significantly free and an evil state of
affairs is not subsequently created? Is the existence of such a world logically possible? The
argument presented in this section holds that the existence of such a world cannot logically exist.
In order for humans to be significantly free, they must have a real ability to choose one
way or another, one action or the next at any given time. Their choices and actions, then, either
contribute to the good in the world or contribute to the evil in the world. The critic’s response to
the theory that God could have created a world in which human beings are significantly free and
an evil state of affairs is not subsequently created fails because the critic is not taking into
account the broad failure of humanity to choose good in every specific situation, even though
humans choose good in many specific situations. Therefore, creating a world where both humans
are significantly free and an evil state of affairs is not subsequently created is not logically
possible. Does this conclusion mean that God cannot do the logically impossible? If He cannot,
is He not omnipotent?
The question of God’s ability, or lack thereof, to do the logically impossible, can be
understood through a rephrasing of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma is
presented in a Platonic dialogue in which Socrates and Euthyphro discuss and search for the
nature of morality. Socrates asks Euthyphro the following question and creates what is called the
Euthyphro Dilemma: “The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or
holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.”16 David
Baggett presents the dilemma in a more modern way by asking, “Is something moral because
God commands it or does God command it because it is moral?”. 17 What results from answering
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that something is moral because God commands it? Morality becomes arbitrary. Morality is
merely what God chooses one day and the next day. What results from answering that God
commands something because it is moral? God is no longer needed for morality. He merely
identifies what is already moral, and morality preexists God. So, either morality is arbitrary and
does not have a true standard or God is not needed for morality. Either conclusion is dangerous
for the theist.
The proposed solution to this dilemma is that something is obligatory because God
commands it, and He commands some things because they are reflective of His own nature.
Since God is unchanging, morality is unchanging and is not arbitrary. Additionally, He does not
command some things because they are moral, but He commands some things because they are
reflective of His own nature, which is the standard for morality. This dilemma and proposed
solution can be rephrased to consider the source and standard of logic.
Is something logical because God acts in a certain way, or does God act in a certain way
because it is logical? What results if the answer is that something is logical because God acts in a
certain way? Similarly, to the dilemma about morality, logic would become arbitrary. The logical
would change day by day as the actions of God changed. What results if the answer is that God
acts in a certain way because it is logical? God is no longer needed for logic. Logic would
preexist God, and God would be bound by it. The atheist may argue that God, indeed, is bound
by logic. He cannot do the logically impossible, so logic must preexist God.
Consider the following solution to this logical “Euthyphro Dilemma.” God acts in a
certain way because it works harmoniously with the way He has created the world, and what is
logical is logical because it is reflective of His very nature. As God is the standard of morality, so
God is the standard of logic. By not doing the logically impossible, God is not losing any rightful
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claim to omnipotence. Instead, He is only acting in a certain way that works together with nature
that He has created to reflect His own nature. God cannot behave in an unloving way because He
is love. He cannot behave in an immoral way because He is the standard for morality. He cannot
behave in an illogical way because He is logic.
At this point, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the word “logical”. One may say
that it is not logical that Jesus would be raised from the dead. The resurrection is an example of
something that is not naturally possible. One may say that it is not logical for God, who is
perfectly holy, to become man and to sacrifice His life for sinners. The incarnation and willful
death of Jesus is not rational perhaps, but it is entirely logical. An example of something that is
not logical would be if a married man claimed that he is a bachelor. By definition of what it
means to be a bachelor, he cannot be one because he is married. Another example would be if
that married man had a daughter, and his daughter came home from school and exclaimed,
“Daddy, I learned how to draw a squared circle today!”. He may rightly think that his daughter
learned how to draw both a square and a circle, but she did not learn how to draw a squared
circle since such a shape cannot logically exist. A final and more relevant example would be if
God can create a world in which He does not exist. Perhaps He could create a world in which He
is not present just as an artist can create a work in which they are not present. If an artist created
a work, he or she is a necessary component of that work. Similarly, if God created a world, then
He is a necessary component of that world. These examples show what is meant by the word
“logical” in this sense. 18 The solution to the logical “Euthyphro dilemma” shows that the
following two premises hold true:
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1. God could not have created a world in which human beings are significantly free and evil
does not exist.
2. God is omnipotent even though He cannot do the logically impossible.
It is worth recalling the contributions of G.W. Leibniz as it relates to this discussion.
Leibniz shares his solution to the problem of evil by arguing that God chose the best of all
possible worlds. In short, God, in all of His wisdom, could see all possible worlds that He could
have created, and He chose the one with the least amount of evil and the most good. This
argument is best understood considering that Leibniz is working under the presupposition that
the best possible world is also a world containing human freedom, and because of this freedom,
evil necessarily exists. Plantinga would disagree with Leibniz’ theory.
Plantinga would argue that the very idea of a “best” possible world may not actually
exist, outside of heaven. For example, a world containing moral good, human freedom, and no
moral evil would be an example of the best possible world; however, any world containing
human freedom will also contain moral evil. 19 Therefore, this version of the “best possible
world” does not actually exist. Another example with more minor differences would be a world
containing just one more person who is enjoying the best that life has to offer. A final example is
offered by Nick Trakakis. He wonders, “why would God decide to create a world containing
both humans and horrific natural evil rather than a world that lacks any such evil and is inhabited
by creatures who can have lives that are just as meaningful as any human life?”20 Plantinga’s
response to these “best possible worlds” would be to say that “God, though omnipotent, could

“Any world” in this context excludes heaven because in heaven, human freedom does not necessarily
result in the creation of morally evil state of affairs.
19
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18
not have actualized just any possible world He pleased”. 21 Although it is possible to imagine a
world that is better than the actual world, it is perhaps not possible to create a world that is better
than the actual world. Consider Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God as it
relates to this discussion.
In his argument, Anselm shows that anything that exists is greater than anything that does
not exist. His argument can be understood through the following six statements:
1. God, as we have defined him to be in the generally accepted view, possibly exists.
2. If God possibly exists, then he must actually exist because if God does not exist, then any
being that actually exists would be greater than God.
3. If God only existed in our imagination, then a real being that existed would be greater
than Him.
4. Thus, a being greater than God would exist.
5. This is logically incoherent, however, because by definition, God is the greatest being.
6. Therefore, God must exist.
To better understand Anselm’s argument in a practical way, imagine that a new coffee
was marketed to the public. This new coffee adapted its flavor regularly to meet the particular
tastes of the consumer, it did not cause an accelerated heartrate, it never caused someone’s hands
to shake after drinking it, and it was also a first-class multi-vitamin supplement. After hearing
about this new coffee, consumers rush to go purchase the coffee. What would happen, though, if
they were then told that this coffee only existed in the imagination? Would they still choose this
seemingly perfect coffee although it does not actually exist, or would they choose any inferior
coffee that actually exists? Of course, the consumers would choose the coffee that actually exists
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even though the imagined coffee would be preferable if it were to exist. This example shows that
something that exists is better than something that only exists in the imagination, even if the
something in the imagination would be better if it did actually exist. In the same way, a world
containing moral good, human freedom, and no moral evil may exist in the imagination, but
since it does not actually exist, the actual world is greater than the world in the imagination,
since such a world can only exist in the imagination.
Conclusion
An adequate response to the problem of moral evil is now in clear view. As shown by
restating the argument of David Hume, if God is able and willing to eradicate evil, then evil does
not exist unless God has a reason to permit evil. To claim that evil cannot coexist with a good
and all-powerful God is to exclude the possibility that a good and all-powerful God may have a
reason to permit evil in the world. A possible reason that God could have to permit moral evil in
the world has also been presented. In short, it has been discovered that in order to eliminate all
evil, God would have the following two choices: to eliminate humanity or to eliminate human
freedom. God chose neither of these options, however. He decided it preferable to create a world
in which humans existed and they are significantly free in respect to any given action. This
freedom allows them to choose good and evil. While it is entirely possible that due to the
existence of evil, a god one prefers22 does not exist, the existence of evil is not a proof that God
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20
does not exist. William Lane Craig supports this conclusion writing that the “two premises: ‘1.
Evil exists and 2. God exists’ are not logically contradictory”.23
The philosophical problem of evil, however, is two-fold. It may be entirely rational to
believe that God and moral evil coexist. Reasons for why God would permit moral evil are
readily available. Does the same apply to natural evil? Is it rational to believe that God and
natural evil coexist? Are there reasons for why God would permit natural evil? If God permits
moral evil in the world in order to preserve humanity’s existence and their freedom, what would
God be losing if He were to eliminate natural evil as far as He could? Does God have reasons to
permit natural evil in the world in the same way that He has reasons to permit moral evil? Could
God have created a world where moral evil exists, but natural evil does not exist without losing
some greater good? These are the questions that press on in the discussion at hand. John
Feinberg writes that it is natural evil that “atheists complain about most and theists find most
difficult to justify”.24 It is now time to turn attention to the philosophical problem of natural evil.
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Chapter Three: Natural Evil
Various Definitions of Natural Evil
Before approaching the problem of natural evil and the questions that arise concerning it,
it will be helpful to define what natural evil is and how it differs from moral evil. Glenn
Siniscalchi writes that natural evil is “a failure, defect, or absence in the structure or process of a
thing”.25 Siniscalchi’s definition provides a way to identify a particular instance of natural evil,
but it does not explain where it may come from. Charles Darwin, by contrast, provides a specific
example of natural evil and shares his thoughts concerning the cause of natural evil. He writes, “I
cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the
Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their larvae feeding within the bodies of living
caterpillars”.26 C.S. Lewis writes that “Christianity creates the problem of pain, for pain would
be no problem unless, side by side with our daily experience of this painful world, we had
received what we think a good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving”. 27 Lewis
also notes that the answer for human pain “cannot be extended to animal pain”. 28 Another
commonly used way to refer to natural evil is to call it “physical evil”.
Each of these definitions can prove to be helpful for their own reasons, but an alternative
definition will be used here for the discussion at hand. Since moral evil can be understood as evil
that exists due to humanity’s freedom and their choice to choose evil, natural evil can be defined
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as “evil that cannot be attributed to the free actions of human beings”. 29 Nick Trakakis suggests a
very similar definition of natural evil. He defines natural evil as “evil that results from the
operation of natural processes in such a way that no human being can be held morally
accountable for the resultant evil.”30 Common examples of occurrences of natural evil may be
suffering due to earthquakes or tsunamis, disease, and birth defects. John S. Mill puts the
problem of natural evil into perspective writing that, “Everything which the worst men commit
either against life or property is perpetrated on a larger scale by natural agents”. 31 While the story
of one man killing another will make the news because of how horrific murder is, many more
people die every day due to natural evil found in nature. The philosophical problem of natural
evil presents a unique dilemma for the theist since culpability for moral evil can fall on
humanity, whereas culpability for natural evil is not as clear. Where does this culpability fall
then? Who is at fault for the existence of natural evil? Critics would argue that culpability would
fall on God since He is the creator of the world.
In the sections that follow, the goal is to show that it is reasonable and rational to believe
in God despite the existence of natural evil in the world. Does He have reasons to permit natural
evil that are not visible to humanity? Is it possible that natural evil may be caused by a nonhuman act of freedom? Is it possible that a key element of creation would be lost if God were to
eliminate natural evil as far as He could? Finally, is it possible that God may have an ultimate
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answer to natural evil that justifies its existence in the world? Several theistic defenses will be
shared and evaluated before examining one final defense that sets the problem of evil within a
wider perspective. Before turning to these ideas, it is time to return to Plantinga’s defense.
Specifically, how does Plantinga’s free-will defense answer, or fail to answer, the problem of
natural evil?
Limitations of Plantinga’s Defense
Alvin Plantinga’s Free-Will Defense thoroughly answers the question of moral evil. He
shifts directly to the issues surrounding specifically natural evil, and he recalls the work of St.
Augustine who attributes natural evil to the free actions of nonhuman beings. For this reason,
Plantinga puts moral evil and natural evil into a larger category together calling both types of evil
“broadly moral evil”.32 He specifies that broadly moral evil can be understood as evil caused by
the free actions of human and nonhuman beings. Therefore, both moral evil and natural evil are
caused by the free actions of human and nonhuman beings.
Plantinga succeeds by accomplishing what he set out to do.33 His defense cannot
reasonably be used to respond to the issues of natural evil because his purpose was to respond to
J.L. Mackie specifically. The difficulty with natural evil in the world is that the reason that God
has to permit natural evil is not as easily seen or understood as it is with moral evil. As shown
previously, if God were to eliminate all moral evil, He would have the following two options: to
eliminate humanity or to take away humanity’s free-will. God must prefer a world where
humanity exists and is actually free to choose because it is in such a world that humanity can
choose to have relationship with Him. With this understanding in mind, God’s choice to give
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humanity free will can be easily understood. In short, if God removed humanity’s free will, they
could not choose to have relationship with Him. If God removed humanity’s free will, He would
be losing an essential part of the world He desired to create. What would be lost if God
eliminated natural evil? What reason does He have to permit it in the world? The answer to these
questions is what Plantinga did not intend to answer in his discourse, and the lack of such
answers reveals the limitations of his defense.
Plantinga does offer one potential reason why God would permit natural evil. He writes,
“it is conceivable that some natural evils and some persons are so related that the persons would
have produced less moral good if the evils had been absent”. 34 This theory is certainly possible
and can be demonstrated in various ways. A person can do moral good by lending a hand to a
neighbor who has lost their home to a natural disaster. If the natural disaster had not taken place,
the person would not have had the opportunity to display charity and compassion. In other
words, if natural evil did not exist then less moral good would exist in the world. While this
explanation is entirely likely and difficult to disprove, counterarguments exist that take away
some of the apparent success of this defense. As will be discussed later, Stanley Kane makes the
argument that evil is not necessary to do moral good in the world. For example, why would a
person need the excuse of a natural disaster to show charity and compassion on their neighbor?
Could they not display such traits in a moment when an occurrence of natural evil is not in clear
view?
Plantinga’s free will defense succeeds in showing the direct relationship between
humanity’s free will and the moral evil that exists in the world. He also succeeds in giving
reasons why God would want humans to have free will even if it ultimately resulted in the
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existence of evil in the world as well. His defense was not intended to offer reasons why God
would not stop natural evil, however. Now that the success and limitations of Plantinga’s defense
is in clear view, it is time to turn attention to several defenses of Christianity in light of the
problem of evil that may offer solutions to the problem of natural evil specifically and reasons
that God would permit it in the world. The first defense to consider will be Augustine’s theodicy.
Several Defenses
Augustine’s Theodicy
Augustine’s theodicy carries some similarities with Plantinga’s free-will defense, but
differences remain. There are three points that are central to understanding Augustine’s beliefs
on the problem of natural evil. First, Augustine famously defines evil as the “privation of
good”.35 If everything that God created is good, and evil is not good, then God did not create evil.
If God created everything, but God did not create evil, then evil must not be a substance. By this
logic, Augustine argues that evil is not a substance, that there is no such thing as evil, but evil is
the privation of good. It is not a substance in of itself, but it the absence of something in a
substance. As Augustine clearly states, “there is no such entity as ‘evil’; ‘evil’ is merely a name
for the privation of good.”36 The reason for the creation of the universe is found in God’s
ultimate purpose which is to create good. God, being perfect, only created good. Augustine
argues that evil, then, is the absence of good in a substance.
He shares two examples that illustrate the relationship between good and evil. Augustine
explains, “We are familiar with darkness and silence, and we can only be aware of them by
means of eyes and ears, but this is not by perception but by absence of perception”. 37 He argues
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that greed, lust, boasting, and pride are not evil. Instead, evil is pursuing riches and leaving
justice for riches. Evil is chasing after pleasures and leaving self-control for pleasure. Evil is
prioritizing praise over righteousness. Evil is loving one’s own power and forgetting the power
of the all-powerful.38 These examples show that God did not create evil, but humanity’s free
actions concerning created things is what creates the privation of good things. Evil is the
privation of good.
The second point central to Augustine’s theodicy is that moral and natural evil are the
consequence of the abuse of free will. Similarly to Plantinga’s defense, Augustine attributes
moral evil to the free actions of human beings who choose to go wrong. The result of such
decisions brings the consequences of moral and natural evil. God allows these consequences to
follow because He gives humans true freedom. If moral and natural evil are caused by
humanity’s free choices, then God is not held responsible for the existence of evil in the world.
Rather, God is justified in allowing humanity to have the consequences of their actions. By his
view, natural evil is also a result of humanity’s free will and their choice to use it for evil.
The third point central to Augustine’s theodicy is that natural evil is the result of free
actions of human and nonhuman persons. This point, although similar to the second, deserves its
own discussion because of how it separates Augustine’s theodicy from Plantinga’s defense.
Recall that Plantinga attributed natural evil to the free actions of nonhuman persons. Augustine
attributes natural evil to the free actions of both human and nonhuman persons.
John Feinberg supports this thinking by pointing to the narrative in Genesis 3:17c-19 and
Paul’s teaching found in Romans 8:18-22. Genesis 3:17c-19 says, “Cursed is the ground for your
sake; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life. Both thorns and thistles it shall bring forth
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for you, and you shall eat the herb of the field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread til
you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; for dust you are, and to dust you shall
return”.39 This passage is spoken in response to humanity’s decision to sin and go against what
God asked of them. The curse described in Genesis 3 falls into the category of natural evil even
though it was caused by free actions of human beings. This example supports a key difference
between Augustine and Plantinga’s thinking. While Plantinga attributes natural evil to the free
actions of nonhuman beings, Augustine shows that natural evil can also be caused by the free
actions of human beings. The passage from Genesis 3 serves as a clear response to critics who
believe that humanity cannot be held responsible for specific acts of natural evil.
Romans 8:20-22 says, “For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but
because of Him who subjected it in hope; because the creation itself also will be delivered from
the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the
whole creation groans and labors with birth pangs together until now”. Paul’s teaching in
Romans reveals that nature was subject to changes due to the fall in Genesis 3. Free actions of
humanity caused natural evil in this case. Feinberg writes concerning this passage in Romans,
“The whole creation groans and suffers in anticipation of a new order God will eventually
institute that will overcome sin and all its effects”. 40 Feinberg believes that humanity’s sin altered
nature in such a way that caused natural evil to exist. He explains this belief further by writing,
“Had sin not entered the world, I take it that biblical teaching implies that natural processes
wouldn’t function in ways that contribute to or cause death”. 41 He argues that Adam and Eve
knew that they would die if they sinned, and they did sin. Therefore, something must take their
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life. If mankind must die because of their choice to use their freedom for evil, they must die of
something. Could it be that the fall of man is the cause of disease, earthquakes, miscarriages, and
other examples of natural evil that cause humans to die? If so, the existence of natural evil can, at
least partly, be attributed to the free actions of human persons, as Augustine argues.
Lastly, Feinberg offers the suggestion that “it is only a matter of His grace that we don’t
suffer more of these natural evils and die sooner”. 42 If Adam and Eve knew they would die if
they disobeyed God, it could have likely been a surprise to them when they did not die
immediately. It is God’s grace that allowed them to continue living despite their disobedience. In
sum, Augustine’s theodicy contains the following three key points:
1. Evil is the privation of good. The reason for the creation of the universe was God’s
ultimate purpose which is to create good.
2. Moral and natural evil are the natural consequences of the abuse of free-will.
3. Natural evil is the result of free actions of human and nonhuman persons.
Augustine’s theodicy contributes to the problem of natural evil by showing the
connection between humanity’s actions and the natural evil that exists in the world. While some
argue that mankind is responsible for only moral evil, Augustine’s theodicy gives a clear
understanding that mankind can also be culpable for the existence of natural evil.
Augustine also attributes natural evil to a broader type of moral evil caused by the free
will of human and nonhuman beings. In this way, Plantinga’s free-will defense is further
supported in its attempt to answer to problem of natural evil by Augustine. As it has been shown,
God chose to give free-will to humanity because if He were to remove this free will, He would
be removing humanity’s ability to choose relationship with Him. This same free will is what
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allows humanity to go against God and cause both moral and natural evil in the world. Although
Plantinga and Augustine generally agree on their explanation of the cause of natural evil,
defenses of their type are not the only response to this problem. Some thinkers have questioned
the very foundation of the problem of evil. John Hick, for example, believes that the purpose of
creation should be considered to better understand the situation at hand. He would argue, as it
will be shown, that the purpose of creation is “soul-building”, and it is through this
understanding that creation should be evaluated and the problem of evil should be discussed.
Hick’s Soul-building Theodicy
John Hick first recognizes the difference between the emotional problem and the
philosophical problem. He writes that, “the intellectual problem, which invites rational
reflection, is distinct from the experienced mystery, which must be faced in the actual business
of living”.43 Hick relies on “the actual business of living” to respond to the issues of natural evil.
As previously noted, Hick considers the very foundation of the problem of evil in his
discussion to create a type of foundation by which he can work on. He calls for a new
perspective on humanity. Instead of viewing humanity as a completed work, he views humanity
as a piece of creation that is still in process.44 Hick refers to Genesis 1:26 to clarify his point.
Genesis 1:26 says, “Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness’…”. 45 The
key point to understand here is one that Irenaeus made clear. He suggests that man was made in
God’s image but is being continuously formed into God’s likeness. Although mankind is made in
the image of God, they are being formed day to day into His likeness.46 This continual formation
43
Mark Larrimore, The Problem of Evil: Hick, The ‘Vale of Soul-Making’ Theodicy, (Malden, Mass:
Blackwell, 2001), 355.
44

Ibid., 356.

45

Unless otherwise noted, all references to scripture are from the English Standard Version

46

Hick, The ‘Vale of Soul-Making’ Theodicy, p. 356.

30
of humanity is what Hick refers to as “soul-building” and it serves as the foundation of his
theodicy.
As discussed previously, if God were to eliminate humanity’s free will, He would be
eliminating their opportunity to have relationship with Him. Hick agrees with this conclusion,
but he draws two other conclusions as well. 47 In all, Hick believes that there are primarily three
things that would be lost if God did not give humanity free will:
1. Man could not have genuine relationship with God.
2. Man could not be free, as He is free. 48
3. Man could not be perfected.49
Hick views human freedom as the vehicle for man’s formation into the likeness of God.
He writes that, “man is in process of becoming the perfected being whom God is seeking to
create through a hazardous adventure of individual freedom”.50 Hick’s view is that humanity is
being perfected through the practice of free-will and the consequences that follow. One of these
consequences, of course, is the existence of evil in the world. It is important to note that the
words “image” and “likeness” found in Genesis 1:26 are not universally recognized as an
intentional choice to show that humanity is made in the image of God and is being continually
formed into the His likeness. In Exodus 20, similar words are used in the giving of the 10
Commandments. Exodus 20:4 says, “You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any
likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water
under the earth”. It is possible that the word choice of “image” and “likeness” were used

47

Ibid., 357.

48

In other words, man would not be created in His image.

49

In other words, man would not be able to be formed into His likeness.

50

Hick, The ‘Vale of Soul-Making’ Theodicy, p. 357.

31
intentionally to teach against the use of idols which were prevalent at the time of the original
audience of the readers of Genesis and Exodus. Although this interpretation can be supported,
Hick’s argument does not necessarily need the text in Genesis 1:26 to support his claim that God
is forming mankind after His likeness.51 His theodicy enjoys support throughout scripture.
Returning to Hick’s line of thinking, he suggests that the world should not be evaluated
based on its fitness to offer the maximum amount of pleasure for humanity and the least amount
of pain. Instead, the world should be evaluated in terms of if “this is the kind of world that God
might make as an environment in which moral beings may be fashioned, through their own free
insights and responses, into ‘children of God’”. 52 Stated differently, the way humanity
understands the purpose of the world impacts what question is asked about creation. Any tool is
judged according to its purpose. A hammer is judged by its usefulness is driving a nail into
wood. Similarly, Hick teaches that the world should be judged by its usefulness in the process of
soul-building.53 With this new perspective in mind, the existence of evil, both moral and natural
evil, is justified by its role in the process of soul-building. In other words, a possible reason that
God has to permit natural evil in the world is soul-building.
Hick concludes his argument by pointing to the result of soul-building. He looks to the
future.54 He writes that, “Instead of looking to the past for its clue to the mystery of evil, it looks
to the future, and indeed to that ultimate future to which only faith can look…the good that
outshines all ill is not a paradise long since lost, but a kingdom which is yet to come in its full
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glory and permanence”.55 The kingdom which is yet to come is the reward for those who
embrace the process of soul-building and are formed into the likeness of God. The Apostle Paul
in his Epistle to the Romans, calls upon similar thinking. Romans 8:18 says, “I consider that the
sufferings of this present time are not worthy with the glory that is to be revealed to us.”
To summarize Hick’s theodicy, He presupposes that both theists and atheists have an
understanding of what they believe to be the purpose of the world, and this purpose informs how
they evaluate the problem of evil. As mankind’s free will causes both moral and natural evil in
the world, opportunity is presented for humans to grow and be formed into the likeness of God.
While critics of Christianity who offer arguments against Christianity from the problem of evil
presuppose that the purpose of the world is to maximize happiness, Hick presupposes that the
purpose of the world is soul-building. The argument of the opponent of Christianity frames the
problem of evil in the following way:
1. God’s purpose for the world must be to maximize happiness of humanity.
2. The existence of evil in the world does not maximize happiness of humanity.
3. Therefore, God must either not exist or not be good.
By contrast, Hick’s soul-building theodicy can be understood through the following
premises:
1. The purpose of the world is primarily soul-building.
2. Evil creates opportunity for soul-building.
3. Therefore, the goal of soul-building justifies the existence of evil in the world.
Stanley Kane offers a critique of Hick’s theodicy that should now be considered. Kane
understands that Hick teaches that, “soul-making requires the development of such traits as
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fortitude, courage, compassion. This justifies the existence of many evils, since these evils are a
logically necessary condition for the development of such traits”. 56 Kane disagrees by pointing
out that the development of these traits does not require evil, but they can be developed through
other situations not involving the existence of evil at all. 57
Consider the courage displayed by a man who competes and finishes in an Iron Man
event after taking a decade off from competing. Consider the strength developed in a woman
who perseveres through graduate school while raising a newborn child. Consider the compassion
displayed in the friend who cheers on the man competing in the Iron Man or the compassion
displayed in the man who supports his wife in her graduate school. None of these examples
include any evidence of the existence of evil, yet courage, strength, and compassion are
developed.58 Kane uses examples similar to these to argue that God does not need evil to develop
these traits, so soul-building is not an adequate explanation to the existence of evil. Further, Kane
shares examples of soul-building in the presence of evil and wonders why this is how the process
of soul-building must take place.59 Why does courage have to be displayed in a five-year old girl
who has lost her mother to cancer? Why does compassion have to be displayed in caring for a
boy who, stricken with the grief of his mother leaving him and his siblings, has lost the ability to
speak? Why does strength have to be grown through rebuilding a community after being crippled
by a natural disaster?
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While these examples and other examples offered by Kane certainly point out that a trait
may be displayed without the apparent existence of evil, two things must be kept in mind. First,
human freedom, as has been shown previously, is the cause of evil in the world. Without human
freedom, there would be no evil in the world, so there would be no actual opportunity to display
courage or compassion in the first place. Although examples can be given of a human displaying
a positive trait in the absence of evil, the reality is that the world is not absent of evil because
humanity is free to choose. Second, Kane’s assessment of the problem says little about the actual
existence of evil in the world. He does not offer an argument that shows that it is irrational to
believe in God in the midst of evil existing in the world. He merely points out that traits like
courage and compassion could be developed without evil.60
Kane’s second critique of Hick’s theodicy questions his theodicy in terms of how it fits
within Hick’s own worldview. He argues that the process of soul-building is “pointlessly absurd
when set within the context of Hick’s total worldview”.61 In light of how Hick concludes his
argument looking to the future kingdom that will be established, Kane points out that this future
kingdom is one without evil. 62 Kane concludes that Hick’s theodicy is self-defeating because “it
seems pointless to want or to have the quality of courage if there would never be any call for the
show of courageous action”. 63 Interestingly, it seems that Kane’s own thinking solves the
dilemma he presents Hick. Recall that Kane pointed out strongly that there are situations where
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traits like courage and compassion can be displayed without the presence of evil.64 Stated plainly,
Kane argues the following two things:
1. Evil is not necessary to display courage and compassion.
2. Without evil, no one could display courage or compassion.
Unfortunately for Kane, his argument against Hick is self-defeating. The merit in Kane’s
critique of Hick’s theodicy is found in the purpose of evil in the process of soul-making. If the
existence of evil is justified by its role in soul-building, what can be made of the lack of evil
when the future kingdom is established? Will humanity no longer be in the process of being
formed into His likeness in this new kingdom? It seems that Hick’s response could be that
although evil can be a tool for soul-building, it is not the only tool to accomplish soul-building.
Another defense that is similar to Hick’s soul-building theodicy, is what will be referred to as the
Divine Purpose of Happiness argument.
Divine Purpose of Happiness
Like Hick’s soul-building argument, the Divine Purpose of Happiness argument
questions the foundation of the problem of evil by examining the purpose of creation. Hick
writes that “anti-theistic writers almost invariably assume a conception of the divine purpose
which is contrary to the Christian conception. They assume that the purpose of a loving God
must be to create a hedonistic paradise”. 65 This presupposition about the divine purpose of God is
vital in understanding the lens that an anti-theistic writer may have while discussing the topic of
evil. If their view of the world is that God has attempted to create a paradise with no evil, pain,
or suffering, then it may be very reasonable to assume that God is either not loving enough to
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actualize such a world or He is not powerful enough to create it. Hick argues, as discussed
previously, the purpose of creation is soul-building and bringing of many sons to glory.66 The
Divine Purpose of Happiness argument, influenced greatly by George Schlesinger, holds that it
was not God’s purpose in creation to create a hedonistic paradise as some anti-theistic writers
assume.
George Schlesinger points out the irrationality of the idea that God would create the
world with the purpose to maximize happiness of humanity. 67 He shares an analogy of a human
parent raising a child to illustrate his point. He gives two options. In the first option, the goal of
the parent is to keep the child happy. The parents keep the child in their room and do not allow
them access to the outside world which will reveal pain, suffering, failure and the like. They
focus only on giving the child what she wants and satisfying her wants. They do not give her an
instrument to learn to play because she may experience failure in learning to play. Likewise, she
may never learn to overcome and the joy that comes with overcoming. They do not introduce her
to neighbors because new friends may leave and cause pain in a relationship ending. Likewise,
she may never learn the joys of friendship. In the second option, the goal of the parent is to grow
the child into being a kind of person that is preferable to be. The parent allows the child to gain
intelligence and experience by accessing the outside world. They care about satisfying their
child’s wants, but they also prioritize growing qualities and characteristics that will cause the
child to grow into a person that one would desire to be like. They introduce her to a piano, so she
can learn both the struggle of learning and the joy of overcoming a struggle. They introduce her
to new neighbors, so she learns both the pain of losing a friend and the joys of friendship.
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Schlesinger writes on a topic he refers to as the “degree of desirability of a state”. He
writes, “apparently the degree of desirability of a state is not a simple function of a single
factor—namely the degree to which one’s wants are satisfied—but it is also dependent on the
kind of being one is”.68 He believes that the child in the first option, although happier, is far less
intelligent and has not developed characteristics and qualities that are desirable. The child in the
second example, although slightly less happy because she has experienced hardships, is better off
because she has become a person that someone would want to be. 69 To put the point clearly,
consider which is better: to keep a child in a state where they know neither joy nor suffering,
triumph nor falling short, excitement nor boredom; or to put the child in a position to obtain
characteristics and qualities that are desirable even if difficulty and hardships must be
experienced in order to obtain them? If human parents can understand the importance of not
simply prioritizing happiness in raising a child, would God not also have the wisdom to know
that the goal of humanity is more than being happy?
While anti-theistic writers assume that the purpose of the world is to maximum
happiness, Schlesinger and Hick show that the purpose of the world is more than offering
happiness to humanity. This new lens that Schlesinger and Hick offer allows someone to view
the existence of evil in the world in a different light. Instead of seeing the existence of evil as
proof that God is either not loving enough or not powerful enough to actualize the world He
desires to create, one may view the existence of evil in the world as a result of human and
nonhuman actions, like Augustine and Plantinga show. Furthermore, the existence of evil can
offer opportunity to develop qualities and characteristics that are desirable to have.
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The understanding of the purpose of creation is of vital importance in interpreting the
existence of evil in the world. One’s purpose drives their actions. To offer one final example, a
father’s purpose in his relationship with his son has never been to make his son happy. His
purpose, instead, is to love him in every moment. Due to this purpose, there are times where the
father’s love suspends his son’s happiness temporarily in order to love him through a mistake
and help his son grow. Similarly, God’s purpose is not to maximize happiness and maintain
humanity’s happiness in the world. Instead, He may very well be satisfied in temporarily
suspending a human’s happiness in order to aid in the process of soul-building and bringing
many sons to glory.
The G.E. Moore Shift
Now that several arguments have been shared in defense of Christianity in light of the
problem of natural evil, one final defense will be described with the goal to further support the
fact that it is entirely rational to believe in the Christian God although natural evil exists in the
world. The final defense to share will be referred to as the “Evil Defeated” defense of
Christianity. Before discussing this defense, it will prove helpful to first look at the G.E. Moore
shift as a similar ‘shift’ is relied upon in the Evil Defeated defense of Christianity.
In an essay written by William L. Rowe, Rowe attempts to build an argument from evil
that will support someone being an atheist. He then shares what he believes to be the best
defense that a Christian could offer in light of this argument. Rowe’s evidential argument relies
on ‘gratuitous evils’. ‘Gratuitous evils’ can be defined as occurrences of evil that do not aid in
furthering any greater purpose or stop the occurrences of an even greater evil. The term
‘gratuitous evil’ will be used later in this discussion, but for now attention is turned to Rowe’s
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argument which he believes rationalizes the atheistic view of evil. Rowe’s argument can be
understood through the following three statements:
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some
evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense
suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good
or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 70
By Rowe’s understanding, if any one occurrence of evil could be proven to be gratuitous
then it follows that either God does not exist or He is not omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly
good. Most notably, Rowe shares the example of a fawn who suffers and dies alone in the forest
due to an occurrence of natural evil. This example of the fawn who suffers and dies alone offers
an occurrence of evil that certainly appears to be gratuitous. At the very least, how could a theist
show that there is a greater good served by the fawn’s death or that a greater evil was avoided
through the fawn’s death? The theist does not have the knowledge to show that either could be
true. Therefore, this occurrence of evil must be gratuitous and, according to Rowe’s evidential
argument, God does not exist.
The G.E. Moore shift rephrases Rowe’s argument to put the burden of proof back on the
atheist. If Rowe’s argument can be seen as “p,q, then r.”, Moore shifts the argument to “not-r,q,
then not-p”. Rephrased, Moore shifts the argument to the following three statements:
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1. There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering
it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting
some evil equally bad or worse.
3. It is not the case that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent,
omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 71
This shift shows that just as the theist will not always have access to the knowledge to
determine what specific good comes from an occurrence of evil, the atheist also will not always
have access to the knowledge that some good absolutely does not come from an occurrence of
evil. In this way, Rowe’s evidential argument only proves that both the theist and the atheist are
limited in knowledge. A similar shift in argument like the one that Moore proposes will be
utilized in the Evil Defeated defense of Christianity.
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Chapter Four: A New Alternative: The Evil Defeated Defense
Returning to Rowe’s evidential argument, he makes the case that any occurrence of
gratuitous evil is evidence that the theistic God does not exist. Successful counterarguments to
Rowe’s evidential argument make specific use of how Rowe uses the word ‘appears’. He argues
that occurrences of evil that appear to be gratuitous are examples of evil that God did not have to
permit in order to bring about a greater good. Since the suffering and death of the fawn appears
to be gratuitous, then that particular occurrence of evil questions why God would permit this
particular occurrence of evil because it does not bring about a greater good. Marilyn Adams and
Robert Adams write concerning this point of the argument saying, “the crux of his argument is
that much suffering ‘does not appear to serve any outweighing good” 72. Although the fawn’s
suffering certainly appears to be gratuitous, it does not follow that it is necessarily gratuitous.
At this point, it will prove helpful to make the distinction between gratuitous evils and
apparently gratuitous evils. The working definition for apparently gratuitous evils can be “any
occurrence of evil that does not appear to aid in furthering any greater purpose or stop the
occurrence of an even worse evil, yet upon further analysis or a wider perspective, it is shown
that the occurrence of evil did, indeed, aid in furthering a greater purpose or stop the occurrence
of an even worse evil”. Consider the following three examples of evil occurring.
1. A man cuts a child open.
2. A woman cries out in pain.
3. A farmer’s field is burnt.
Each of these three examples reveal occurrences of evil that could support the argument
from evil against Christianity. If God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient, why
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would He allow a child to be cut open, a woman to experience pain, or a farmer’s field to burn
down? Why would He not step in to stop such occurrences of evil? From this perspective, the
problem of evil against Christianity presses on. Do the results of these three examples justify the
means? Consider, however, the same three examples with additional context:
1. A man cuts a child open in order to provide life-saving surgery.
2. A woman cries out in pain necessary to deliver a baby.
3. A farmer’s field is burnt in order to improve the health of the ground.
Without the context of the life-saving surgery, the cutting open of the child is an excellent
example of moral evil. The case can still be made that the cutting itself is intrinsically evil,
however, the explanation of why this evil is permitted is entirely rational. Without the context of
birthing a baby, the pain of the mother is an example of apparently gratuitous evil. Her pain is
validated by the reward of the child. Again, her pain may still be intrinsically evil, but the reason
that God permits this specific evil is in clear view. Additionally, as previously noted, it is
possible that some occurrences of natural evil are the result of humanity’s free will and decision
to choose evil over good. Recall that Genesis 3:16 points to such an occurrence of natural evil.
The pain of the mother in childbirth provides an example of natural evil caused by the free will
of humanity and its consequences that follow. Without the context of the reason that the farmer
burnt his field, the burning of the field would be an example of gratuitous evil in nature. Another
way to determine how someone can decide if any evil is actually gratuitous is by using a tool
shared by Stephen Wykstra.
Wykstra responds to Rowe’s argument claiming that Rowe does not have reasonable
epistemic access to know what he claims to know. How, asks Wkystra, could Rowe know
absolutely that the fawn’s suffering is actually gratuitous? Does Rowe have the knowledge
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necessary to make such a statement? Wykstra refers to this necessary knowledge as ‘epistemic
access’. Wykstra writes in his response, “it is reasonable to think one has ‘epistemic access’ to
the truth of ‘p through s.’ Let us call this ‘the Condition Of Reasonable Epistemic Access’, or—
for short—CORNEA.”73 Stated differently, does Rowe have reasonable epistemic access to make
his claim? More broadly, does someone have epistemic access to reasonably claim that any
particular occurrence of evil is actually gratuitous? Wykstra answers the question concerning
Rowe’s epistemic access specifically regarding the fawn’s suffering by saying that Rowe does
not have such epistemic access. In order for Rowe to have justification in his claim that the
fawn’s suffering is actually gratuitous, Rowe would either need to be omniscient or he would
need access to learn from someone who is omniscient. Wykstra argues that Rowe’s argument
fails because he cannot prove that the fawn’s suffering is actually gratuitous; he can only
reasonably argue that the fawn’s suffering is an example of apparently gratuitous evil.
The difference between gratuitous evil and apparently gratuitous evil serves as a
foundation to the Evil Defeated Defense. Two terms must be defined before outlining this
defense of Christianity in light of the problem of natural evil. First, evils that ‘are yet undefeated’
are “occurrences of evil that have not been defeated by any greater purpose or greater good”.
These occurrences of evil, to Rowe’s point, are gratuitous in nature but will one day be defeated.
An ‘defeated evil’ is “any occurrence of evil that may not appear to be defeated by any greater
purpose or greater good, yet upon further analysis or a wider perspective, it is shown that the
occurrence of evil was, indeed, defeated by a greater purpose or greater good”.
The Evil Defeated Defense is rooted in the difference that perspective makes when
analyzing any occurrence of evil. Specifically, the present perspective that humanity has is
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limited when determining whether any specific occurrence of evil is yet undefeated or a defeated
evil. The Evil Defeated Defense can be understood through the following three premises and the
shift that follows shortly after:
1. If there are evils left undefeated, then the problem of evil persists.
2. There are evils left undefeated.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil persists.
It is evident that there exist occurrences of evil that have not been defeated. Therefore,
the problem of evil persists. However, will there always be specific occurrences of evil that are
not defeated? The Evil Defeated Defense shows that through the epistemic access required to
decide if any evil is undefeated or only not yet defeated, it can be shown that the problem of evil
will not always persist. Unfortunately for the present time, humanity does not have the epistemic
access to know how exactly each occurrence of evil will be overcome in the future. In broad
terms, however, the very foundations of evil will be defeated, and each particular occurrence of
evil will also be defeated. The very foundations of evil will be defeated, and each particular
occurrence will also be defeated through the work of Jesus on the cross. Romans 8:25 says that
Jesus was “delivered up for our trespasses and raised for our justification.”
By His death and resurrection, the sin of humanity has been paid for, and humanity has
been justified in the eyes of God. Perhaps the most daring response to the problem of evil is the
response that God has toward it. He did not elect to refrain from creating anything in the first
place in order to not face evil. He did not choose to eliminate humanity in order to eliminate the
consequences of evil in the world. He did not decide to eliminate humanity’s free will. He made
the choice to face evil directly. God willingly became acquainted with grief and suffering,
became a man of sorrows, a victim of injustice, and was made subject to evil. He did so because
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He knew has victory over grief, suffering, sorrow, injustice, and evil. As Isaiah 53:3 says, “He
was despised and rejected by men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, and as one from
whom men hide their faces he was despised, and we esteemed him not.” Although humanity
rejected Him, He faced evil and emerged victorious on humanity’s behalf. The Evil Defeated
Defense is rooted in the fact that God took humanity’s place, paid their price for sin, and
defeated evil so they may be free from it.
David Baggett and Jerry Walls observe that the problem facing the critic is that “God
himself is working to overcome with his plan of salvation and redemption at the end of the world
when all evil will be decisively defeated. Death itself will be overcome having already received a
mortal blow in the resurrection of Jesus”. 74 In other words, no evil will be left undefeated. All
evil will be defeated by the greatest good. Fyodor Dostoevsky shares his view on the ultimate
solution to evil. Dostoevsky, like Paul highlights in Romans 8:18, points to the future as
justification for the evil that occurs. Dostoevsky writes the following:
I believe like a child that suffering will be healed and made up for, that all the humiliating
absurdity of human contradictions will vanish like a pitiful mirage, like the despicable
fabrication of the impotent and infinitely small Euclidean mind of man, that in the
world’s finale, at the moment of eternal harmony, something so precious will come to
pass that it will suffice for all hearts, for the comforting of all resentments, for the
atonement of all the crimes of humanity, of all the blood they’ve shed; that it will make it
not only possible to forgive but to justify all that has happened. 75
The Evil Defeated Argument can be rephrased as the following three statements:
1. If all evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist.
2. The only evils that exist today are evils that are ‘yet defeated’.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil will no longer persist.
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How would an opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense respond to this argument? They
would likely counter premise 2, that no evil will be left undefeated. They would do this because
premise 1 is self-evident as discussions of this sort are still taking place regularly. The third
premise follows logically from premise 1 and 2, so this argument hinges upon the truth of the
second premise, that no evil will be left undefeated. In order to counter the second premise, an
opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense would have to show that it is likely that any particular
occurrence of evil cannot be defeated. The difficulty with such an assertion is that the opponent
of the Evil Defeated Defense would be in a similar spot to that of William Rowe when he makes
the claim that a particular occurrence of evil is actually gratuitous without having access to the
knowledge required to make such a claim. As Rowe cannot actually determine the truth of his
claim, an opponent of the Evil Defeated Defense cannot actually show that an occurrence of evil
cannot be defeated. Such knowledge is beyond their grasp. Therefore, they cannot show that
premise 2 is likely untrue. It is at least possible that premise 2 is true, and the Evil Defeated
Defense stands as follows:
1. If all evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist.
2. The only evils that exist today are evils that are ‘yet defeated’.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil will no longer persist.
The Implications of a Past Victory and Future Hope on Present Evil
The arguments and defenses shared previously show that God does have reason to permit
natural evil in the world, and the truth of evil being defeated will resolve the ultimate problem of
evil. His reasons include allowing humanity to enjoy free will and the consequences that follow
necessarily for their freedom to be true freedom. Another reason He may have is the purpose of
soul-building, as suggested by Hick. However, both of these victories fail to answer the question
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of the present evil and the sufferer who is struggling through an occurrence of evil today. The
understanding that God has good reasons to permit evil certainly aids in the philosophical
discussion of God’s existence, but it does little to contribute to the questions that a present
sufferer has. The promise that all evil will be defeated is certainly a welcomed truth regarding
the future state of humanity, but again, it does not answer the dilemma that a human is facing
today in the face of natural evil. The final question to answer in this discussion is the following:
What implications does a past victory and a future hope have on present-day natural evil?
The past victory to consider carefully is the work of Jesus on the cross and His
resurrection. He is a victor over both suffering, evil, and death. The unique part of His victory is
that His victory over suffering, evil, and death was a victory on humanity’s behalf. The results of
this victory extend to present suffering. To illustrate this victory on humanity’s behalf, consider
the following story.
There was a camp counselor who heard one of the boys in his group cry out in pain when
he fell and broke his leg in two places. While they waited for medical help to arrive, the
counselor held the boy’s hand as he cried out in pain. The counselor thought to himself, “I wish I
could change places with him and take the burden of this pain”. This wish, in reality, is not one
that can come true because the camp counselor is limited by what he can physically do. The
camp counselor cannot actually switch places with the boy who is in pain. If, however, the
counselor’s wish could come true, it is likely that he may decide to not switch places with the
boy after all when presented with the option to actually do it.
This example illustrates the uniqueness of what Jesus accomplished on behalf of
humanity. When presented with the opportunity to actually take humanity’s place in facing evil,
suffering and death, Jesus chose to do so. C.S. Lewis explains the position that God was in when
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making this substitution. Observe Lewis’ writing as He writes from God’s perspective, “You
cannot, and you dare not. I could and dared”76. Jesus took the place of humanity in both suffering
and death. Furthermore, He is “the Father of mercies and God of all comfort” 77. He comforts
humanity in their present sufferings. The past victory of Jesus is beneficial to humanity today
when they face evil of all kinds because He identifies with humanity’s suffering and comforts
them through it.
The future hope to consider now is the return of Jesus and the judgement that will come.
The problem of evil as it is faced now is in a unique time in history because although Christ has
defeated suffering, evil, and death, there is still work yet to be done. The problem of evil is still a
present reality although, as it has been shown, evil will be defeated, and the problem of evil will
no longer be a problem at all. The Christian hope of the future is in Christ’s return and judgment
on all. In His righteous judgement, every wrong will be made right. The result of this impending
judgment is detailed clearly in Revelation 21. Verse 3 shows that God’s dwelling place is with
humanity and they will be His people. Furthermore, God will “wipe away every tear from their
eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain anymore,
for the former things have passed away”. 78 This future hope points to a judgement that will
resolve evil that has occurred in the past.
Revelation 21 points to a second result of this coming judgment. Verse 8 shows that, “for
the cowardly, the faithless, the detestable, for the murders, the sexually immoral, sorcerers,
idolaters, and the liars, their portion will be in the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is
the second death”. In other words, God will judge moral evildoers. The coming judgment may be
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welcomed by Nick Trakakis, who views theistic philosophers as people who wear “rose-colored
glasses.”79 He asserts that the general theistic response to the problem of evil is overly optimistic
when theists declare that God will one day overcome all evil in such a way that “any victims
would not wish that the course of their lives would have taken a less evil-strewn path.”80
Although victims of evil may gain this perspective, God will not merely “sweep evil under the
rug” or simply overlook wrongdoing and injustice in the world. He faced evil directly by
surrendering to the cross, but there is still work to do. He will return and judge moral evildoers.
More than this, there will be a new heaven and a new earth, for “the first heaven and the
first earth had passed away”. 81 God will make all things new. The result of humanity’s sin and
natural evil in the world will no longer have its effect as God makes all things new. This future
hope has specific implications for the issue of natural evil because those who have put their faith
in Christ will inhabit this new creation that Christ has for them, and natural evil will no longer
impact humanity. N.T. Wright affirms this idea agreeing that the “ultimate answer to the problem
of evil is to be found in God’s creation of a new world, new heavens and new earth, with
redeemed, renewed human beings ruling over it and bringing it to God’s wise, healing order”. 82
Although the world is currently full of evils that are ‘yet defeated’, the problem of evil will
ultimately be resolved when Christ returns.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
It is now in clear view that it is rational to believe in God despite the existence of natural
evil in the world. Furthermore, several possible reasons that God may have to permit specific
occurrences of natural evil have been shared. As some scholars argue, a response to broadly
moral evil, both moral and natural evil, can be shared to respond to natural evil. Plantinga, one of
such scholars, displays the role of significantly free beings in the existence of evil in the world,
both moral and natural evil. Plantinga also shares one of the reasons that God would permit evil
to occur which is allowing free beings to experience the consequences from their free decisions. 83
A response to a critical question was shared in regard to the possibility or the logical possibility
that God could create any world that He desired. It was shown that it is not logically possible for
God to create a world with significantly free beings and no natural evil since human beings
would go wrong in regard to at least one action.
Natural evil can be defined as “evil that cannot be attributed to the free actions of human
beings”. Plantinga’s free-will defense was found to be helpful but not intended to respond to
natural evil. Although his defense is limited in answering specifically the issues of natural evil,
other writers have helpful contributions to the topic. To begin, Augustine of Hippo emphasized
that natural evil is the result of free actions of human and nonhuman persons.84 John Hick returns
to the foundational question of the purpose of the world in discussing the existence of natural
evil. He encourages people to ask what God’s purpose is for the world, and he answers this
question by sharing that the primary purpose of the world is soul-building.85 In his view, natural
evil should not be discussed assuming that the primary purpose of the world is human happiness.
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Rather, natural evil should be discussed understanding the true purpose of the world which is
soul-building, and due to this, the occurrence of natural evil in the world is justified. 86 Another
similar argument is offered by George Schlesinger who affirms Hick’s theodicy, putting God’s
greater purpose for humanity into clear view. 87 Unlike the common misunderstanding that God
desired to create a hedonistic paradise for human beings, Schlesinger argues that the
development of desirable characteristics is preferable to living a somewhat happier life. 88 His
argument gives a rational defense of the occurrence of natural evil in the world.
The final argument shared in this discussion is the Evil Defeated Defense, which puts the
problem of natural evil into a framework requiring a different perspective than the present
perspective. As there are specific occurrences of evil that have not been defeated, the dilemma of
the problem of evil persists presently. However, if every occurrence of evil will be defeated, then
the problem of evil will no longer persist. Revelation 21 and Romans 8 both point to this
impending defeat of evil and a new creation that humanity will enjoy. Every wrong will be made
right, all evil will be made untrue, the old will pass away, and there will be a new creation
without pain, suffering, and evil in the world. In all, it is rational to believe in the existence of
God despite the existence of natural evil in the world. Furthermore, it is rational to put one’s
faith in God because it is through Him alone that evil will be defeated. The following
representation of the Evil Defeated Defense can be reasonably upheld:
1. If all evil will be defeated, then the problem of evil will no longer persist.
2. The only evils that exist today are evils that are ‘yet defeated’.
3. Therefore, the problem of evil will no longer persist.
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